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Uncivil	Disobedience:	Political	Commitment	and	Violence		 N.	P.	Adams		Standard	 definitions	 of	 civil	 disobedience	 include	 nonviolence	 as	 a	 necessary	 condition:	any	 violence	 puts	 protest	 outside	 the	 conceptual	 bounds,	 and	 so	 justificatory	 bounds,	 of	civil	 disobedience.	 As	 John	 Rawls	 (1999,	 p.	 321)	 says	 in	 his	 canonical	 discussion,	 “To	engage	in	violent	acts	likely	to	injure	and	to	hurt	is	incompatible	with	civil	disobedience.”	On	 this	 view,	 as	Hugo	Bedau	 (1961,	 p.	 656)	 puts	 it,	 “the	 pun	 on	 ‘civil’	 is	 essential:”	 civil	disobedience	 is	both	civil	 in	 the	sense	 that	 it	 relates	 to	 the	public	 sphere	and	civil	 in	 the	sense	that	it	is	polite.	Violence	is	certainly	uncivil	in	the	latter	sense	and	it	is	often	argued	that	it	is	uncivil	in	the	former	sense	as	well.1	This	standard	understanding	is	bolstered	by	two	of	the	paradigmatic	and	most	influential	examples	of	civil	disobedience,	namely	those	of	Mohandas	Gandhi	and	Martin	Luther	King,	 Jr.	These	deeply	religious	leaders	promoted	nonviolence	both	as	a	means	and	as	an	end	 in	 itself,	 thereby	entangling	nonviolence	and	civil	disobedience	in	the	minds	of	many.		 There	 has	 long	 been	 a	 strain	 of	 thought,	 however,	 that	 resists	 defining	 civil	disobedience	 as	 necessarily	 nonviolent	 (Lang	 1970;	 Morreall	 1976;	 Zinn	 1990;	 Moraro	2007;	Raz	2009;	Simmons	2010;	Brownlee	2012;	Celikates	2016).	This	dissent	has	many	roots,	including	disagreement	over	the	nature	of	violence	and	the	desire	to	better	describe	a	wider	range	of	political	practice.	Here	I	follow	this	revisionary	strain	of	thought	and	argue	that	violence	and	civil	disobedience	are	not	incompatible	in	principle.	In	particular,	I	argue	that	civil	disobedience	can	be	violent	when	the	violence	is	not	directed	at	persons.		There	 are	 three	 general	 strategies	 one	 could	 employ	 to	 argue	 for	 the	 conceptual	coherence	of	civil	disobedience	and	violence.	The	first	is	to	take	standard	understandings	of	both	 civil	disobedience	and	violence	and	 to	 reinterpret	 their	 relation.	As	noted	above,	others	have	pursued	this	line	of	thought.	A	second	strategy	is	to	offer	novel	understandings	of	both	civil	disobedience	and	violence,	a	considerably	heavier	argumentative	burden,	and	to	 show	 how	 they	 interrelate.	 The	 third	 strategy	 is	 to	 reinterpret	 one	 of	 the	 central	concepts	 but	 leave	 the	 other	 in	 place.	 I	 pursue	 this	 third	 strategy.	 I	 propose	 a	 novel	understanding	 of	 civil	 disobedience	 that	 centers	 on	 what	 I	 call	 the	 “commitment	 to	 the	political.”	 Focusing	 on	 the	 commitment	 to	 the	 political	 enables	 a	 clearer	 and	 ultimately	more	 plausible	 discussion	 of	 various	 kinds	 of	 violence	 and	 their	 potential	 role	 in	 civil	disobedience.	As	I	explain	in	section	three,	I	do	not	offer	a	novel	understanding	of	violence.	Of	course,	there	is	also	disagreement	about	the	concept	of	violence,	so	the	understanding	of	violence	that	I	employ	is	necessarily	contested	(Bufacchi	2005).	I	offer	some	support	for	my	stance	below,	but	I	do	not	have	the	space	to	undertake	a	complete	defense	here.																																																									1	Even	this	minimal	characterization	of	violence	has	been	challenged:	Kimberley	Brownlee	notes	that	fencing	is	in	some	senses	both	violent	and	polite	(2012,	p.	22).	
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In	section	one	I	explain	what	I	take	to	be	the	distinctive	feature	of	civil	disobedience,	namely	 that	 it	 is	 an	 act	 of	 remedial	 law-breaking	 that	 gets	 is	 special	 character	 from	 its	combination	of	condemnation	of	a	political	practice	with	a	commitment	to	the	political.	In	section	two	I	explain	the	crucial	notion	of	a	commitment	to	the	political	and	I	argue	against	the	 Rawlsian	 notion	 of	 fidelity	 to	 law.	 Finally,	 in	 section	 three	 I	 apply	 the	 new	understanding	of	the	commitment	to	the	political	to	the	issue	of	violence.	Although	here	I	exclusively	 pursue	 the	 implications	 of	 the	 commitment	 to	 the	 political	 for	 the	 issue	 of	violence,	understanding	 civil	disobedience	 in	 this	manner	also	has	 implications	 for	other	aspects	of	the	practice.	I	leave	those	further	explorations	for	another	venue.		 Before	 proceeding,	 an	 important	 caveat:	 nothing	 that	 I	 say	 here	 denies	 that	nonviolence	is	 immensely	preferable	to	violence,	both	intrinsically	and	instrumentally.	As	Joseph	Raz	 (2009,	 p.	 268)	 notes,	 even	 if	we	 admit	 that	 violence	 can	 play	 a	 role	 in	 some	cases,	 it	 should	 still	 be	 “used	 only	 very	 rarely	 and	with	 great	 caution.”	 Further,	 there	 is	good	 reason	 to	 think	 that	 nonviolent	 resistance	 is	 strategically	 superior	 to	 violent	resistance	 in	 general	 (Chenoweth	 and	 Stephan	 2012).	 My	 concern	 here	 is	 conceptual	coherence,	not	important	further	issues	of	justification	and	strategy.		 1.	Civil	Disobedience		We	can	dispense	with	one	point	immediately:	puns	are	not	arguments.	The	fact	that	‘civil’	has	different	senses	does	not	constrain	our	 theory.	While	 I	would	prefer	 to	use	a	clearer	term	 like	 ‘political	 disobedience’	 (Markovits	 2005),	 the	 debate	 has	 settled	 on	 ‘civil’	 even	when	 the	 question	 of	 violent	 disobedience	 is	 left	 open.	 Civil-qua-political	 disobedience	(rather	than	civil-qua-polite	disobedience)	captures	a	particular	kind	of	political	act	based	on	 its	 two	 terminological	elements.	By	 “disobedience”	 I	mean	 the	 intentional	breaking	of	specific	 laws.	 This	 distinguishes	 civil	 disobedience	 from,	 on	 one	 hand,	 protest	 that	 is	perfectly	 legal	 under	 a	 particular	 legal	 regime,	 and,	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 unintentional	 or	indiscriminate	 law-breaking.	 By	 “civil”	 (qua	 political)	 I	 mean	 with	 the	 intention	 of	remedying	some	public	practice	that	is	sincerely	held	to	be	unjust.	This	distinguishes	civil	disobedience	from	private	 law-breaking	of	two	sorts:	 law-breaking	aimed	at	private	gain,	as	 in	 the	 case	 of	 theft,	 and	 law-breaking	 for	 reasons	 of	 personal	 ethics,	 as	 in	 the	 case	 of	conscientious	refusal.2	What	I	am	arguing,	 then,	 is	that	violent	civil	disobedience,	or	uncivil	
disobedience,	is	a	coherent	concept.		 Ultimately	 the	 concept	 of	 uncivil	 disobedience	 allows	 us	 to	 more	 accurately	understand,	 describe,	 and	 proscribe	 our	 political	 world.	 An	 important	 case	 in	 the	development	of	my	thoughts	about	uncivil	disobedience	was	the	burning	of	a	police	cruiser	in	Ferguson,	Missouri	(Toler	2014).	Many	observers	and	commentators	contrasted	the	civil																																																									2	I	do	not	restrict	the	intention	to	changing	“political”	practice	because	civil	disobedience	can	aim	to	politicize	something	currently	conceptualized	as	strictly	private.	
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disobedience	of	marchers	and	protestors	with	the	uncivil,	apparently	violent	destruction	of	the	 police	 cruiser.	 This	 immediately	 raised	 a	 question:	 did	 this	 really	 not	 count	 as	 civil	disobedience?	It	did	not	substantially	risk	harm	to	any	persons	and	it	seemed	to	convey	the	same	message	as	protesting	but	with	more	vigor	and	more	impact.	Other	questions	arose	as	well—for	example,	whether	it	could	be	distinguished	from	damage	to	private	property	and	how	to	contextualize	it	in	relation	to	other	events	of	that	evening,	week,	and	year—but	this	 fundamental	 conceptual	 question	 seemed	 to	me	 to	 require	 consideration	on	 its	 own	terms.	Accurately	 characterizing	 this	 act	matters	 for	 investigating	 its	 justification	 and	 its	potential	repetition,	its	connection	to	social	movements	of	the	past	and	future,	as	well	as	its	character	and	effectiveness.		 As	Rawls	(1999,	p.	322)	notes,	civil	disobedience	lies	at	“the	outer	edge”	of	political	practice.	Although	it	pushes	the	boundaries	of	the	political,	we	must	make	room	in	both	our	concepts	and	our	justifications	for	such	disobedience.	As	Jürgen	Habermas,	Hannah	Arendt,	and	 others	 have	 persuasively	 argued,	 civil	 disobedience	 is	 a	 healthy	 part	 of	 any	 good	society	 because	 it	 represents	 the	 deep	 convictions	 of	 citizens	 committed	 to	 exposing	injustice,	 constantly	 keeping	 political	 power	 in	 check	 and	 holding	 decision-makers	accountable	(Arendt	1972,	p.	96;	Habermas	1985,	pp.	103-5;	Rawls	1999,	pp.	336-37;	Sabl	2001,	pp.	307,	327).	Even	under	 legitimate	regimes,	 ineliminable	 features	of	government	make	such	contestatory	practices	valuable,	including	benign	features	like	institutional	drift	as	 well	 as	 pernicious	 features	 like	 the	 corrupting	 influence	 of	 concentrated	 power	(Markovits	2005;	Smith	2011).			 The	key	for	understanding	civil	disobedience	is	capturing	how	it	remains	within	but	at	 the	 edge	 of	 the	 political.	 While	 my	 purpose	 here	 is	 not	 to	 develop	 or	 defend	 a	 full	definition	 of	 civil	 disobedience,	 I	 give	 a	 novel	 explanation	 of	 the	 central	 feature	 of	 the	practice,	 which	 delimits	 the	 role	 of	 violence	 in	 my	 arguments	 below.	 The	 core	 of	 civil	disobedience	is	that	it	necessarily	communicates	two	things,	simultaneously	but	strainedly:	on	one	hand,	 it	 communicates	 a	 condemnation	of	 a	 political	 practice,	while	 on	 the	 other	hand	it	communicates	a	commitment	to	the	political.3	Its	special	character—and,	often,	its	special	 persuasive	 force	 or	 appeal—comes	 from	 the	 interaction	 between	 these	 two	components	 by	 making	 clear	 that	 this	 particular	 act	 of	 law-breaking	 is	 principled	 and	aimed	at	improving	our	shared	political	condition.		Civil	 disobedience	 communicates	 a	 disconnect	 between	 the	 values	 underlying	 the	political	 project	 and	 how	 that	 project	 is	 being	 carried	 out	 in	 practice	 by	 contrasting	 the	disobedient’s	commitment	to	the	political	project	with	her	willingness	to	break	the	law	that	is	 supposed	 to	 embody	 and	uphold	 that	 very	project.	 Civil	 disobedience	does	not	 simply	communicate	 perceived	 mistakes,	 which	 the	 militant	 may	 also	 communicate,	 but	inconsistencies.	The	appeal	made	by	disobedients,	then,	is	an	appeal	on	the	basis	of	shared																																																									3	See	 Brownlee	 (2012)	 for	 the	most	 fully	 developed	 and	 insightful	 discussion	 of	 disobedience	 as	 an	 act	 of	communication.		
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ground	that	the	audience	is	already	committed	to,	rather	than	the	more	removed	appeal	of	mere	mistake.	Further,	the	disobedients’	simultaneous	condemnation	and	commitment	do	more	 than	 say	 that	 there	 is	 an	 inconsistency,	 they	 demonstrate	 the	 inconsistency.	 The	particular	 character	 of	 civil	 disobedience	 as	 a	 distinct	 phenomenon,	 worthy	 of	characterization	 and	 analysis	 in	 its	 own	 right,	 is	 that	 it	 performs	 the	 very	 same	 tension	between	 political	 ideals	 and	 actions	 that	 it	 aims	 to	 identify	 and	 remedy	 in	 the	 broader	community.	Its	condemnation	is	heightened	by	the	costs	of	law-breaking	and	the	contrast	with	its	commitment	to	the	political	is	concomitantly	heightened	as	well.	The	 question,	 then,	 is	 how	 this	 combination	 of	 condemnation	 and	 commitment	constrains	 an	 act	 of	 civil	 disobedience.	 Law-breaking	 demonstrates	 condemnation	 quite	directly;	 the	main	concern	is	making	clear	the	object	of	condemnation.	The	more	difficult	part	of	civil	disobedience	is	expressing	a	commitment	to	the	political,	for	law-breaking	per	se	seems	to	imply	the	lack	of	such	a	commitment.	Thus	much	of	the	debate	over	the	concept	of	and	justificatory	conditions	on	civil	disobedience	hinges	on	how	the	commitment	to	the	political	 can	 be	 expressed.	 For	 example,	 Rawls	 demands	 that	 disobedients	 be	 willing	 to	accept	 punishment	 specifically	 on	 the	 grounds	 that	 such	 a	 willingness	 shows	 the	disobedient	to	be	“within	the	limits	of	fidelity	to	law”	(1999,	p.	322).	He	contrasts	this	with	the	case	of	the	militant	who	is	not	willing	to	accept	punishment	because	“militant	action	is	not	within	the	bounds	of	fidelity	to	law,	but	represents	a	more	profound	opposition	to	the	legal	order”	(1999,	p.	323).	Some	of	the	disagreement	over	whether	civil	disobedience	must	be	 public,	 forewarned,	 or	 non-anonymous	 also	 rests	 on	 whether	 such	 elements	 are	necessary	to	remain	within	a	commitment	to	the	political.			 2.	Political	Commitment		The	 central	 question	 is	whether	 violence	 necessarily	 contradicts	 the	 commitment	 to	 the	political	 that	 civil	 disobedience	must	 demonstrate.	 In	 order	 to	 answer	 this	 question,	we	must	first	get	clear	on	the	commitment	to	the	political.	In	this	section	I	argue	for	a	rather	minimalist,	 thin	 notion	 of	 commitment	 to	 the	 political:	 commitment	 to	 the	 idea	 of	 the	shared	project	 of	 living	 together.	 I	make	 this	 argument	 along	 three	 avenues:	by	 showing	why	 the	 traditional	 Rawlsian	 notion	 of	 fidelity	 to	 law	 is	 too	 strong,	 by	 showing	 that	my	notion	of	the	political	unifies	a	distinct	practice	across	a	desirable	range	of	contexts,	and	by	showing	the	advantages	of	my	notion	in	relation	to	other	extant	accounts.	What	I	call	 the	commitment	to	the	political,	Rawls	understands	as	“fidelity	to	 law”	and	he	argues	(1999,	p.	322)	that	fidelity	to	law	is	inconsistent	with	violence:		The	 law	 is	 broken,	 but	 fidelity	 to	 law	 is	 expressed	 by	 the	 public	 and	nonviolent	 nature	 of	 the	 act,	 by	 the	 willingness	 to	 accept	 the	 legal	consequences	of	one’s	conduct.	This	 fidelity	 to	 law	helps	 to	establish	 to	 the	majority	that	the	act	is	indeed	politically	conscientious	and	sincere,	and	that	it	is	intended	to	address	the	public’s	sense	of	justice.	To	be	completely	open	
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and	nonviolent	is	to	give	bond	of	one’s	sincerity,	for	it	is	not	easy	to	convince	another	 that	 one’s	 acts	 are	 conscientious,	 or	 even	 to	be	 sure	 of	 this	 before	oneself.		The	 first	 question	 is	 what	 fidelity	 to	 law	means.	 As	William	 E.	 Scheuerman	 (2015)	 and	others	argue,	it	is	a	mistake	to	incorporate	this	notion	of	fidelity	to	law	into	our	concept	of	civil	disobedience	if	we	interpret	it	as	fidelity	to	the	actual	law.	Fidelity	 to	 actual	 law	 rules	 out	 too	 many	 paradigmatic	 historical	 cases	 of	 civil	disobedience,	 including	both	Gandhi	and	King	(Lyons	1998).	Gandhi	was	a	revolutionary,	rightfully	 viewing	 Britain’s	 colonial	 rule	 as	 illegitimate	 and	 condemning	 it	 as	 such;	 his	nonviolence	was	not	motivated	by	fidelity	to	the	actual	oppressive	law.	Rawls	constricts	his	attention	to	disobedience	within	a	legitimate,	near-just	state	and	so	ends	up	characterizing	disobedients	 as	 reformers,	 critiquing	 a	 particular	 aspect	 of	 a	 system	 that	 they	 are	committed	 to	on	 the	whole.4	This	has	 the	 advantage	of	 offering	 a	 clear	 contrast	between	disobedients	and	revolutionaries	but	excludes	too	much.5		It	 is	 unfortunate	 that	 the	 literature	 treats	 Rawls’	 definition	 as	 canonical,	understandable	as	that	may	be.	His	consideration	of	the	practice	comes	in	the	context	of	a	discussion	of	political	obligation	and	he	explicitly	frames	the	problem	of	civil	disobedience	as	a	challenge	to	political	obligation,	the	limits	of	democratic	rule,	and	obedience	to	unjust	laws.	He	notes	 that	his	 theory	of	 civil	disobedience	 is	 “framed	 for	 special	 circumstances”	(1999,	 p.	 319)	 and	 its	 purpose	 is	 “to	 narrow	 the	 disparity	 between	 the	 conscientious	convictions	of	those	who	accept	the	basic	principles	of	a	democratic	society”	(1999,	p.	320).	I	think	this	leads	Rawls	to	mistake	justificatory	conditions	for	conceptual	conditions.	He	defines	civil	disobedience	in	an	extremely	narrow	way	not	because	he	is	 interested	in	characterizing	 a	 multifaceted	 political	 practice	 but	 because	 he	 is	 interested	 in	 whether	there	 is	 any	 case	where	 law-breaking	 could	be	 justified	under	 conditions	where	political	obligation	otherwise	holds.	To	do	so	he	restricts	his	attention	to	the	most	justifiable	case	he	can	 imagine	 but	 instead	 of	 framing	 its	 features	 in	 terms	 of	 justifiability,	 he	 incorporates	them	directly	into	his	definition.	Importantly,	though,	I	am	interested	in	civil	disobedience	for	reasons	that	go	beyond	its	relation	to	political	obligation	(Raz	2009,	p.	265).	In	particular,	even	if	the	justificatory	question	 is	 uninteresting	 in	 illegitimate	 regimes	 (because,	 as	 Rawls	 notes,	 if	 militant	revolution	is	 justified	then	a	fortiori	mere	disobedience	is	 justified),	 it	 is	not	the	case	that	civil	 disobedience	 as	 a	 distinct	 political	 practice	 is	 uninteresting.	 Even	 in	 an	 illegitimate	regime	we	often	have	good	reasons	 to	 choose	 to	engage	only,	or	at	 least	 initially,	 in	 civil	disobedience.	For	example,	militant	revolution	is	only	justified	as	a	last	resort	and	engaging	in	 civil	 disobedience	 is	 likely	 one	of	 the	 steps	 that	must	be	 explored	before	 a	 last	 resort																																																									4	See	Sabl	(2001)	for	a	particularly	informative	discussion	of	Rawls’	notion	of	“near-just”	societies.	5	For	more	along	this	line,	see	Scheuerman	(2016).	
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constraint	is	fulfilled.	Similarly,	it	can	be	the	case	that	an	illegitimate	regime	lacks	the	right	not	 to	 be	 overthrown	 but	 that	 other	 factors,	 such	 as	 likelihood	 of	 success	 or	proportionality,	make	militant	 revolution	 unjustified	 for	 citizens.	 In	 such	 a	 case	 the	 only	justifiable	 route	 may	 be	 civil	 disobedience	 even	 though	 there	 is	 no	 general	 political	obligation.	 Further,	 even	when	militant	 revolution	 is	 justified,	 tactically	 speaking	 it	may	make	 sense	 to	 remain	within	 the	 bounds	 of	 civil	 disobedience,	 so	we	need	 to	 be	 able	 to	distinguish	 the	 practice	 from	 militancy	 for	 strategic	 reasons	 (Chenoweth	 and	 Stephan	2011).	 Finally,	 for	 those	 opposed	 to	 militancy	 on	 political,	 religious,	 or	 purely	 moral	grounds	also	need	to	be	able	to	identify	a	distinct	practice	of	civil	disobedience.		Another	way	of	highlighting	the	distinctiveness	of	civil	disobedience	apart	from	the	question	 of	 its	 justification	 is	 that	 justification	 focuses	 on	 particular	 acts	 of	 civil	disobedience	but	 the	practice	 itself	 is	best	understood,	both	historically	and	normatively,	as	 a	 part	 of	 broader	 social	 movements.	 For	 example,	 the	 Civil	 Rights	 movement	 in	 the	United	 States	 involved	 a	 huge	 range	 of	 tactics	 and	 appeals,	 some	 legal	 and	 some	 illegal,	some	public	and	some	private.	When	put	 into	the	context	of	 the	broader	movement,	civil	disobedience	 is	 only	 one	 part	 of	 the	 whole	 (even	 if,	 for	 many,	 the	 most	 notable	 or	controversial	 feature	of	 the	whole).	Even	when	the	question	of	 justification	 is	settled,	we	still	 want	 to	 be	 able	 to	 distinguish	 the	 various	methods	 and	 tactics	 that	 constituted	 the	movement,	to	consider	their	relation	to	one	another,	their	effectiveness	in	combination	or	in	isolation,	and	their	potential	applicability	to	future	situations.	So	my	project	is	not	Rawls’	project.	The	fact	that	civil	disobedience	may	be	able	to	override	political	obligation	is	interesting	but	that	is	not	its	only	interesting	feature.	Once	we	see	this	we	should	reject	Rawls’	framing	of	the	concept	and	ask	what	features	define	the	practice	 as	 distinct	 and	 useful	 in	 a	 wider	 variety	 of	 contexts.	 Indeed,	 this	 seems	 to	 me	precisely	what	Rawls	would	have	us	do:	“a	useful	theory	defines	a	perspective	within	which	the	 problem	 of	 civil	 disobedience	 can	 be	 approached;	 it	 identifies	 the	 relevant	considerations	and	helps	us	to	assign	them	their	correct	weights”	(1999,	p.	320).	It	is	only	after	 this	 caveat	 that	 Rawls	 proposes	 his	 definition.	 Since	Rawls	 and	 I	 intend	 to	 put	 our	theories	 of	 civil	 disobedience	 to	 use	 for	 different	 purposes,	 we	 require	 different	perspectives	and	differently	weighted	considerations.	My	more	general	purpose	requires	a	broader	 notion	 of	 civil	 disobedience	 and,	 in	 particular,	 a	 broader	 understanding	 of	 the	commitment	to	the	political	than	fidelity	to	law.	The	broader	notion	of	commitment	to	the	political	that	I	am	concerned	with	is	the	idea	 that	political	disobedients	are	 committed	 to	 the	 shared	cooperative	project	of	 living	together.	Unpacking	this	is	important.	A	commitment	to	the	political	presumes	the	goal—living	together—is	both	communal	and	long-term.	It	assumes	that	we	are	going	to	have	to	work	together	 in	the	 future	and	so	 it	 takes	care	to	preserve	relations	between	us	now	as	well.	This	takes	certain	options	off	the	table,	namely	those	options	that	would	render	our	future	cooperation	impossible	and	treats	our	agonists	as	outside	the	political	community.	The	 relevant	 contrasting	 case	 is	 a	 commitment	 to	 achieving	your	preferred	outcomes	no	
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matter	 the	 means	 and	 regardless	 of	 others’	 position	 as	 members	 in	 the	 on-going	community.	 The	 most	 illuminating	 distinction	 is	 not	 between	 the	 disobedient	 and	 the	revolutionary	but	between	the	disobedient	and	the	militant.	Commitment	 to	 the	political	 is	at	 least	 related	 to	Rawls’	notion	of	 reasonableness,	according	to	which	citizens	offer	terms	of	fair	cooperation	that	they	are	willing	to	abide	by	(2005,	p.	49).	Even	if	we	understand	the	commitment	to	the	political	 in	this	way,	though,	we	should	not	 follow	Rawls	 in	understanding	civil	disobedience	as	appealing	 to	a	shared	sense	 of	 justice,	 including	 his	 two	 principles	 of	 justice.	 We	 can	 extract	 the	 notion	 of	appealing	to	others	as	co-members	 in	a	cooperative	project	on	 its	own	terms.	This	aligns	with	 a	 more	 purely	 political	 notion	 of	 civil	 disobedience.	 Justice	 as	 fairness	 is	 one	substantive	and	detailed	way	of	working	out	what	reasonable	engagement	with	others	on	terms	of	respect	and	equality	looks	like,	but	Rawls	admits	that	just	societies	could	come	to	different	reasonable	interpretations	(2005,	pp.	xlvi-ii).		My	 understanding	 of	 the	 commitment	 to	 the	 political	 is	 appropriate	 for	characterizing	 a	 practice	 that	 is	 coherent	 in	 a	wider	 variety	 of	 contexts.	Not	 only	 is	 civil	disobedience	a	coherent	practice	where	there	is	no	shared	sense	of	justice,	it	is	coherent	on	behalf	of	markedly	illiberal	or	inegalitarian	causes.	For	example,	whatever	we	want	to	say	about	their	justifiability,	the	March	2016	sit-ins	in	Pakistan	in	support	of	Mumtaz	Qadri	and	sharia	law	seem	to	fit	squarely	within	the	concept	of	civil	disobedience.	This	 understanding	 of	 political	 disobedients’	 commitment	 to	 the	 political	 can	 be	usefully	 contrasted	 with	 two	 further	 alternatives,	 one	 stronger	 and	 one	 weaker.	 First,	Scheuerman	 (2015,	 pp.	 442ff.)	 argues	 for	 fidelity	 to	 the	 ideal	 of	 rule	 of	 law	 as	 an	interpretation	of	Rawls’	notion	of	fidelity	to	law.	The	focus	is	on	what	Rawls	calls	justice	as	generality,	 which	 allows	 political	 disobedients	 to	 appeal	 to	 the	 procedural	 goods	 of	 law	being	 administered	 fairly.	 Scheuerman	 thus	 captures	 a	 commitment	 to	 the	 political	 in	contexts	where	there	is	no	robust	shared	sense	of	justice	of	the	sort	Rawls	appeals	to	and	in	unjust	circumstances,	where	the	actual	law	may	be	profoundly	unjust.	Scheuerman’s	view	is	close	to	my	own	but	is	more	robust,	so	rules	out	one	case	that	I	 think	 we	 should	 strive	 to	 maintain	 within	 the	 conceptual	 boundaries	 of	 civil	disobedience.6	This	 is	 the	 possibility	 that	 anarchists	 could	 be	 political	 disobedients.	Anarchists	 are	 ex	 hypothesi	 opposed	 to	 the	 sort	 of	 institutionalization	 that	 rule	 of	 law	requires.	 But	 they	 are	 opposed	 on	 specifically	 political	 grounds:	 they	 think	institutionalization	 is	 unnecessary	 to	 successfully	 engage	 in	 the	 shared	 project	 of	 living	together	 and	 that	 institutionalization	 in	 fact	 impedes	 human	 flourishing	 when	 imposed.	This	 is	 a	 coherent,	 principled	political	 position.	We	 should	not	 rule	out	 the	possibility	 of	civil	disobedience	by	anarchists	on	conceptual	grounds.	One	way	of	interpreting	Thoreau,	in	 many	 ways	 the	 wellspring	 of	 our	 modern	 understanding	 of	 civil	 disobedience,	 is																																																									6	Similar	 points	 can	 be	 made	 about	 a	 variety	 of	 more	 robust	 understandings	 of	 the	 commitment	 to	 the	political,	 including	 those	 that	we	 could	 draw	 from	 the	 republican	 characterization	 of	 civil	 disobedience	 in	Markovits	(2005)	or	the	deliberative	democrat	characterization	in	Smith	(2011).	
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precisely	 as	 an	 anarchist	 engaging	 in	 civil	 disobedience	 (Simmons	 2010).7	Indeed,	 Todd	May	 (2015,	 p.	 158)	 interprets	 civil	 disobedience	 of	 the	 paradigmatic,	 nonviolent	 sort	 as	having	an	intrinsic	affinity	with	anarchism.	On	 the	other	hand,	 appealing	 to	 anything	 less	political	 undermines	 the	distinctive	character	of	 civil	disobedience.	Kimberley	Brownlee,	 for	example,	argues	 that	 the	central	feature	of	civil	disobedience	 is	 its	source	 in	conscientious	moral	conviction.	Disobedients	do	not	appeal	to	the	shared	political	project	of	living	together	but	to	the	more	starkly	moral	“principle	 of	 humanism”	 (Brownlee	2012,	 p.	 7).	 This	principle	 requires	us	 to	 respect	 the	deeply	 held	 and	 conscientious	 convictions	 of	 others	 and	 is	 based	 on	 a	 robust	 moral	doctrine	about	the	nature	of	value	pluralism	and	basic	respect	for	the	humanity	of	others.		The	problem	with	 this	 is	not	 the	substance	of	Brownlee’s	moral	claims	but	on	 the	move	away	from	the	political.8	This	move	characterizes	disobedients’	communication	very	differently.	 On	my	more	 political	 view,	 disobedients	 convey	 condemnation	 of	 a	 political	practice	 with	 commitment	 to	 the	 shared	 project	 and	 practice	 of	 living	 together.	 The	condemnation	is	stark	precisely	because	it	is	paired	with	political	commitment.	As	I	argued	above,	 it	embodies	 the	very	political	 tension	that	 it	calls	out;	 it	 is	still,	as	Rawls	(1997,	p.	321)	notes,	“guided	and	justified	by	political	principles.”	On	Brownlee’s	view,	disobedients	convey	condemnation	of	a	political	practice	with	signals	of	the	depth	and	sincerity	of	their	moral	views.	They	make	their	appeal	not	to	an	audience	qua	co-participants	in	the	political	but	qua	humans	worthy	of	respect.	This	is	simply	a	very	different	sort	of	appeal.	As	I	argue	more	 fully	 below,	 it	 also	means	 that	 Brownlee’s	 view	 can	 only	 explain	 the	 limits	 of	 the	practice	with	robust	moral	premises.			 3.	Violence		With	a	fuller	understanding	of	the	commitment	to	the	political	before	us,	we	can	consider	whether	 violence	 is	 inconsistent	 with	 such	 a	 commitment.	 I	 will	 not	 offer	 a	 precise	definition	 of	 violence	 (Bufacchi	 2005,	 May	 2015).9	Below	 I	 distinguish	 several	 types	 of	violence	 but	 a	 general	 theory	 of	 violence	 is	 unnecessary	 for	 our	 purposes.	 To	 be	 clear,	however,	I	do	take	violence	to	primarily	be	a	mode	of	action,	not	a	type	of	action.	Its	most	important	 usage	 is	 adverbial:	 actions	 that	 are	 done	 violently	 are	 done	 forcefully	 and	aggressively.	This	understanding	of	violence	allows	us	to	distinguish	violence	from	harm:	harm	 can	be	done	non-violently,	 as	when	one	person	poisons	 another	 slowly	 and	 subtly	over	 time.	 It	 also	 distinguishes	 violence	 from	 rights-violations,	 injustice,	 and	 coercion.																																																									7	Even	if	we	disagree	with	Simmons’	characterization	of	the	actual	Thoreau,	a	slightly	modified	hypothetical	Thoreau	can	demonstrate	the	case.	8	Similar	worries	arise	for	views	that	appeal	simply	to	principled	objection	(Smart	1978;	Celikates	2016).	9	Some	proposed	definitions	strike	me	as	implausible	and	skew	the	relevant	discussion;	for	example,	Morreall	(1976,	p.	38)	claims	that	violence	is	conceptually	only	directed	at	persons	and	is	necessarily	related	to	rights	claims.	 Similarly,	 German	 federal	 courts	 have	misguidedly	 held	 that	 sitting	 in	 the	 street	 as	 an	 act	 of	 civil	disobedience	can	be	violent	due	to	effects	on	drivers	(Celikates	2016,	pp.	41-2).	
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Definitions	that	elide	all	these	related	but	importantly	distinct	issues	seem	clearly	mistaken	to	me	(Coady	1986).			 While	I	do	not	offer	a	definition	of	violence,	the	characterization	I	just	gave	falls	into	the	minimalist	camp	(Buffachi	2005).	The	main	advantage	of	a	minimalist	understanding	of	violence	 is	 that	 it	 allows	 us	 to	more	 carefully	 distinguish	 various	 phenomena,	 especially	because	it	does	not	normatively	weight	violence	as	other	more	maximalist	definitions	tend	to.	To	my	mind,	the	minimalist	definition	also	fits	better	with	ordinary	usage	of	the	idea	of	violence	whereas	more	maximalist	definitions	find	violence	in	counterintuitive	places.	10			The	main	 complaint	 against	minimalist	 definitions,	 raised	with	 clarity	 by	 Vittorio	Bufacchi,	 is	that	they	miss	psychological	and	structural	violence.	My	own	preference	is	to	claim	 that	 psychological	 violence	 is	 in	 fact	 easily	 captured	 by	 my	 approach;	 imagine	 a	parent	screaming	at	their	child.	Here	excessive	force	and	aggression	are	on	full	display	(as	is	 the	paradigmatic,	but	not	conceptual,	 connection	 to	harm).	As	 for	structural	violence,	 I	am	 more	 sanguine	 about	 its	 exclusion.	 While	 I	 agree	 that	 social	 structures	 can	 harm,	violate,	engender	and	constitute	injustice,	and	employ	and	enable	violence	by	individuals,	I	am	not	sure	that	it	makes	sense	to	say	such	structures	themselves	act	violently.	Finally,	as	seems	correct	to	me,	the	adverbial	usage	locates	violence	in	the	actor	and	not	the	victim,	as	most	maximalist	or	normatively	 laden	definitions	do.	The	angry	man	who	punches	a	wall	may	not	have	harmed	anything	or	violated	any	rights	but	he	clearly	acted	violently,	which	matters	for	our	characterization	of	his	act	and	our	evaluation	of	his	character.	With	 this	 restricted	 notion	 of	 violence	 in	 mind,	 we	 can	 turn	 to	 the	 possibility	 of	violent	 civil	 disobedience.	 To	 narrow	 the	 aim	 of	 the	 argument	 even	 further,	 we	 are	concerned	 only	 with	 constitutive	and	 other-directed	violence.	 First,	 I	 am	 only	 concerned	with	 violence	 that	 constitutes	 the	 act	 of	 civil	 disobedience:	 violence	 in	 the	 very	 act	 of	breaking	 the	 law.	On	one	hand,	 constitutive	violence	contrasts	with	violence	 from	others	responding	to	the	act.	If	reprisal	violence	counts,	then	even	Gandhi	and	King	were	violent.	This	move	makes	nonviolent	disobedience	nearly	impossible	to	achieve	and	too	dependent	on	the	acts	of	others.	It	essentially	rules	out	some	paradigmatic	cases	where	the	brutality	of	the	regime	was	precisely	one	of	objects	of	disobedience,	as	with	Gandhi;	one	of	the	primary	strategic	elements	of	his	campaigns	was	to	contrast	the	nonviolence	of	the	protestors	with	the	brutality	of	the	British	rulers.	While	it	may	seem	obvious	that	reprisal	violence	cannot	render	the	disobedient’s	own	act	violent,	this	worry	did	arise	for	Gandhi	and	it	highlights	the	 problem	 with	 simply	 labeling	 the	 practice	 nonviolent	 tout	 court	 without	 further	explanation.	The	 other	 contrast	 with	 constitutive	 violence	 is	 related	 violence.	 The	 question	 is	whether	violence	that	does	not	constitute	the	relevant	law-breaking	but	is	still	related	to	it	(e.g.	responding	to	reprisals,	resisting	arrest,	and	so	on)	counts	as	violence	for	the	purposes																																																									10	Cf.	May	(2015,	p.	68)	arguing	that	any	undermining	of	dignity	is	violent,	so	toppling	a	dictator’s	statue	is	not	violent	per	se,	but	stomping	on	it	and	denigrating	it	are	violent.	To	be	fair,	May	is	not	concerned	with	defining	violence	per	se,	but	with	defining	a	particularly	robust	kind	of	nonviolent	political	practice.	
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of	 our	 concept.	 Is	 violence	 in	 these	 interactions,	 related	 to	 but	 not	 constituting	 the	 civil	disobedience,	ruled	out?	Put	aside,	for	the	moment,	the	idea	that	resisting	arrest	could	also	constitute	civil	disobedience.	Consider	a	modified	case	from	the	civil	rights	movement.	Civil	rights	workers	Andrew	Goodman,	 James	Chaney,	and	Michael	Schwerner	were	murdered	by	members	of	the	Ku	Klux	Klan	in	Alabama	in	1964.	Imagine	that	this	was	done	in	reprisal	to	 a	 nonviolent	 act	 of	 civil	 disobedience,	 minutes,	 hours,	 or	 days	 later.	 Would	 violent	resistance	 in	 self-defense	 render	 the	 prior	 act	 violent?	 It	 seems	 not;	 these	 are	 simply	separate	 issues,	 even	 though	 the	 violence	 was	 a	 result	 of	 the	 earlier	 act	 of	 civil	disobedience.	 The	 diachronic	 nature	 of	 this	 example	 helps	 make	 clear	 the	 distinction	between	constitutive	and	related	violence	that	can	otherwise	be	muddled	(for	 it	 is	surely	true	both	that	in	close	succession	it	can	be	difficult	to	disentangle	these	moments	and	that	sometimes	 one’s	 commitment	 to	 the	 political	 can	 be	 displayed	 even	more	 clearly	 when	surrendering	to	arrest	or	to	illegal	harsh	reprisals).	Focusing	only	on	constitutive	violence	helps	make	sense	of	the	practice	on	its	own	terms.	This	puzzle	also	helps	us	see	why	civil	disobedience	 should	be	kept	distinct	 from	a	 commitment	 to	nonviolence	more	generally,	which	is	often	concerned	more	broadly	with	a	comprehensive	ethical	ideal	(May	2015).	A	person	 may	 be	 committed	 to	 civil	 disobedience	 in	 the	 political	 sphere	 yet	 not	 to	nonviolence—or	satyagraha,	or	the	intrinsic	dignity	of	all—more	generally.	Second,	other-directed	violence	stands	 in	contrast	 to	self-directed	violence	(Cohen	1972,	p.	298).	Self-directed	violence	can	take	the	form	of	personal	or	property	violence.	A	case	of	each	makes	it	clear	why	self-directed	violence	clearly	falls	within	the	bounds	of	civil	disobedience.	Consider,	first,	the	case	of	Mohamed	Bouazizi,	the	Tunisian	fruit	vendor	who	set	 himself	 on	 fire	 in	 2010,	 sparking	 the	Tunisian	Revolution	 and	 the	Arab	 Spring.	 If	we	hold	 that	 civil	 disobedience	 is	 necessarily	 nonviolent	 and	 that	 self-directed	 personal	violence	is	violent	in	the	appropriate	sense,	then	we	are	forced	to	conclude	that	Bouazizi’s	self-immolation	 was	 something	 other	 than	 civil	 disobedience.	 Yet	 this	 seems	 absurd.	Bouazizi’s	 act	 coheres	 well	 with	 other	 paradigmatic	 cases	 like	 King	 and	 Gandhi,	 who	emphasized	the	role	of	self-sacrifice	and	even	suffering.	Perhaps	suicide	is	too	far;	perhaps	it	conveys	despair	more	than	commitment	to	the	shared	 political	 project	 of	 living	 together,	 for	 it	 takes	 the	 agent	 out	 of	 the	 community.	 I	think	this	assumes	an	overly	narrow	notion	of	the	political	(surely	political	martyrdom	is	a	coherent	concept)	but	then	we	can	imagine	a	case	of	self-directed	violence	of	a	less	drastic	sort;	 carving	 injustices	 into	one’s	 skin,	 for	example.	This	may	be	unwise	 from	a	 strategic	point	 of	 view	 but	 it	 is	 hard	 to	 understand	 why	 it	 would	 necessarily	 conflict	 with	 a	commitment	 to	 the	 political.	 Self-sacrifice,	 including	 self-harm,	 is	 a	 common	 element	 of	such	a	commitment,	as	with	accepting	punishment	or	hunger	strikes.	A	hunger	strike	is	not	violent	 to	my	mind,	since	whatever	harm	it	 inflicts	 is	not	done	violently,	but	 then	we	see	that	 the	 question	 comes	down	 to	whether	 self-directed	harm	done	 violently	 is	 ruled	 out	even	though	hunger	strikes	are	not.			 In	the	case	of	self-directed	property	violence,	imagine	that	flag-burning	is	illegal.	In	
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order	to	protest	this	law,	you	buy	a	flag	and	then	burn	it	in	public.	Again,	whatever	reasons	we	have	for	holding	that	civil	disobedience	is	necessarily	nonviolent,	extending	it	to	mean	that	burning	your	own	personal	flag	to	protest	an	anti-flag-burning	law	is	excessive.	This	is	an	 ideal	 case	of	 civil	disobedience	 in	many	ways:	 it	 is	direct	 (it	breaks	 the	precise	 law	 it	holds	to	be	unjust),	it	is	perfectly	symbolic	(it	destroys	the	most	prominent	symbol	of	the	political	regime	that	imposes	the	contested	law	in	addition	to	breaking	that	very	law),	it	is	self-contained	(not	risking	harm	or	costs	to	anyone	else),	and	it	 is	public.	Ruling	out	such	an	act	on	conceptual	grounds	is	badly	mistaken.	 		 Restricting	our	attention	to	other-directed	constitutive	violence	is	uncontroversial;	such	 restrictions	 are	 often	 implicit	 in	 discussions	 of	 civil	 disobedience.	 In	 addition	 to	simply	 making	 our	 commitments	 explicit,	 though,	 this	 shows	 how	 violence	 is	 quite	obviously	consistent	with	civil	disobedience	in	many	aspects.	This	observation	undermines	at	 least	 one	 potential	 justification	 for	 a	 pure	 nonviolence	 constraint	 noted	 by	 Simmons	(2010,	p.	1808),	namely	that	 law	regulates	violence,	so	violence	of	any	kind	without	legal	authorization	moves	one	outside	civil	disobedience.	This	 is	another	reason	to	understand	civil	 disobedience	 as	 centrally	 involving	 a	 commitment	 to	 the	 political	 thinly	 construed	rather	 than	 to	 the	 actual	 law.	 The	 question,	 then,	 is	 not	 whether	 civil	 disobedience	 is	inconsistent	 with	 violence	 tout	 court,	 but	 more	 particularly	 under	 what	 conditions	 civil	disobedience	is	inconsistent	with	violence	of	certain	sorts.		 In	 particular,	 the	 issue	 is	 whether	 other-directed	 constitutive	 violence	 can	 be	consistent	with	a	commitment	to	the	political.	On	my	construal	of	the	commitment	to	the	political,	 this	 means	 we	 need	 to	 know	 whether	 other-directed	 constitutive	 violence	 is	consistent	 with	 treating	 others	 as	 members	 of	 the	 on-going	 communal	 project	 of	 living	together.	 I	 think	 it	 is	 not:	 violence	 directed	 at	 other	 people	 is	 inconsistent	with	 treating	them	as	members,	and	so	is	inconsistent	with	a	commitment	to	the	political,	and	so	renders	any	violence	directed	at	others	necessarily	not	an	act	of	civil	disobedience.		 In	 some	 respects	 this	 might	 seem	 obvious—certainly	 lethal	 violence	 literally	removes	 others	 from	 the	 on-going	 community.	 But	 there	 is	 an	 important	 puzzle	 here	because	civil	disobedience	often	treats	others	quite	harshly.	Civil	disobedience	can	clearly	set	back	others’	interests,	as	when	a	strike	or	a	sit-in	prevents	people	from	obtaining	some	service,	it	can	infringe	others’	rights,	such	as	their	right	to	free	movement,	and	it	can	coerce	them,	as	 in	 the	most	successful	campaigns	of	civil	disobedience	 like	the	overthrow	of	 the	Marcos	 dictatorship	 in	 the	 Philippines.11	So	 the	 question	 is	whether	we	have	 a	 notion	 of	membership	 that	 rules	 out	 treating	 other	 members	 violently	 but	 not	 setting	 back	 their	interests,	infringing	their	rights,	or	even	coercing	them.			 Notice	that	this	question	is	only	pressing	for	a	minimalist	understanding	of	violence.	If	we	think	any	harm,	rights	infringement,	or	coercion	is	violent,	then	civil	disobedience	is																																																									11	This	 conflicts	 with	 a	 Rawlsian	 strain	 of	 the	 literature	 that	 rules	 out	 coercion,	 claiming	 that	 civil	disobedience	is	only	ever	an	attempt	to	persuade.	This	is,	I	think,	historically	inaccurate	as	well	as	a	result	of	mistakenly	restricting	attention	to	the	near-just	context.	
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obviously	 consistent	 with	 other-directed	 violence,	 on	 pain	 of	 reducing	 the	 practice	 to	irrelevance.	But	if	we	take	violence	in	a	more	restricted	manner,	as	I	think	we	should,	then	the	 question	 is	more	 difficult	 because	 the	 question	 becomes,	 on	my	 adverbial	 construal,	why	treating	others	simply	in	a	particular	mode—forcefully	and	aggressively—is	ruled	out	even	while	 rights	 infringements	 and	 coercion	are	not.	And,	 in	keeping	with	my	desire	 to	describe	 a	 distinctively	 political	 practice,	 the	 answer	 must	 be	 given	 only	 in	 terms	 of	membership	 in	 the	 community	 (not,	 as	 discussed	 below,	 in	 terms	 of	 a	 particular	 ethical	theory).		 The	problem	with	 other-directed	 violence	 is	 that	 it	 treats	 violence	 as	 a	 legitimate	decision-making	procedure	within	the	community,	both	now	and	into	the	future.	 It	 treats	other	 members	 of	 the	 community	 as	 though	 leveling	 sudden,	 aggressive,	 overwhelming	force	at	them	is	an	appropriate	way	to	solve	the	inevitable	disagreements	and	confusions	of	living	together.	Yet	political	community,	conceived	of	as	a	communal	and	diachronic	project	of	 living	 together,	 cannot	 rest	 on	 such	 a	 resolution	 of	 disagreement.	 Violence	 as	 an	adjudication	 procedure	 devolves	 membership	 in	 a	 community	 into	 subjection	 to	 the	strongest,	and	so	not	a	communal	project	at	all.	Such	a	communal	project	undertaken	by	persons	 is	 ultimately	 a	 practice	 of	 justification,	 ruling	 out	 the	 practice	 of	 foregoing	justification	for	overwhelming	force.	Directing	violence	at	persons	removes	them	from	the	class	of	people	that	we	are	committed	to	living	together	with	because	it	treats	them	as	an	obstacle	 to	be	overcome.12	Membership	 in	 a	political	 community	 in	my	 sense	necessarily	requires	putting	aside	acting	violently	as	an	appropriate	way	to	settle	public	disputes.	Due	to	this,	civil	disobedience	cannot	be	violent	in	the	sense	that	violence	is	directed	at	other	persons,	for	example	ruling	out	assault.	It	also	renders	civil	disobedience	on	behalf	of	a	regime	of	might-makes-right	incoherent—if	you	are	committed	to	might-makes-right,	then	the	fact	that	you	are	forced	into	civil	disobedience	because	you	do	not	have	the	power	to	institute	your	preferences	entails	that	your	preferred	regime	is	illegitimate.	To	my	mind,	this	is	the	limit	case	on	the	conceptual	coherence	of	the	practice.		 Some	 theorists	 disagree	 with	 the	 exclusion	 of	 other-directed	 personal	 violence	(Lang	1970;	Smart	1978).	For	example,	A.	John	Simmons	(2010,	p.	1808)	offers	the	case	of	“kidnapping	a	public	official	who	is	instrumental	in	administering	an	unjust	policy.”	While	such	cases	can	certainly	be	morally	justifiable,	as	Simmons	claims,	the	question	is	whether	they	count	as	civil	disobedience	rather	than	as,	for	example,	militancy.	My	claim	is	that	they	cannot	be	civil	disobedience.	Simmons,	following	Rawls	and	others,	focuses	on	the	idea	that	such	 a	 kidnapping	would	 demonstrate	 disrespect	 for	 or	 a	 lack	 of	 fidelity	 to	 the	 law.	My	focus	on	the	commitment	to	the	political,	on	the	other	hand,	asks	whether	we	are	treating	others	as	co-members	in	the	shared	political	project	of	living	together.	Even	if	kidnapping	the	unjust	official	does	not	disrespect	the	law	as	such,	it	treats	the	official	herself	as	outside	the	 bounds	 of	 the	 shared	 political	 project.	 In	 so	 doing	 the	 kidnappers	 in	 fact	 precisely																																																									12	Cf.	Brownlee	(2012,	p.	20);	Moraro	(2007,	p.	3);	Sabl	(2001).	
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communicate	 that	 they	 lack	 a	 commitment	 to	 the	 political.	 That	 is	 why	 such	 personal	violence	is	inconsistent	with	civil	disobedience.		 Other	theorists	have	come	to	similar	conclusions	about	the	bounds	of	violence	and	civil	disobedience,	including	Brownlee	(2012,	p.	20),	Moraro	(2007,	p.	7),	May	(2015)	and	others.	Importantly,	though,	their	conclusions	are	made	on	the	basis	of	more	robust	moral	and	ethical	commitments,	unlike	my	reliance	on	a	thin,	ecumenical	notion	of	the	political.	Both	Brownlee	and	Moraro	appeal	to	Kantian	ethics	for	their	rejection	of	personal	violence	by	arguing	 that	violence	against	persons	 is	unjustified	because	 it	 treats	people	as	a	mere	means	 to	 disobedients’	 political	 goals.	 May	 goes	 even	 further,	 arguing	 that	 nonviolence	expresses	 respect	 for	 the	 dignity	 and	 equal	 status	 of	 all.	 This	 veer	 into	 ethical	 theory	 is	unmotivated	and	unnecessary	to	make	sense	of	the	concept	of	civil	disobedience,	however.	Neither	 Brownlee	 nor	 Moraro	 claims	 to	 be	 making	 an	 explicitly	 Kantian	 case	 for	 civil	disobedience,	 so	 it	 is	 unclear	 why	 Kantian	 ethics	 are	 somehow	 relevant	 at	 this	 point.	Further,	in	keeping	with	the	spirit	of	a	distinctively	political	practice,	it	would	be	better	if	we	 can	 make	 our	 theory	 rely	 on	 the	 notion	 of	 the	 political	 apart	 from	 any	 particular	comprehensive	doctrine—in	 this	 respect	my	purpose	 is	distinct	 from	May’s,	who	aims	 to	characterize	a	comprehensive	ethic	of	nonviolence	rather	than	civil	disobedience.	We	 should	 not	 take	 treating	 others	 as	 members	 of	 the	 political	 project	 of	 living	together	too	robustly.	Consistent	with	the	desire	to	make	coherent	a	wide	range	of	political	practice,	people	can	engage	in	civil	disobedience	without	thinking	that	others	are	equal	co-members—as	noted	above,	civil	disobedience	on	behalf	of	illiberal,	even	oppressive,	causes	is	conceptually	coherent.	Similarly,	civil	disobedience	need	not	be	undertaken	out	of	a	deep	respect	for	others	as	moral	beings,	or	out	of	epistemic	humility,	or	anything	of	the	sort.	One	can	 simply	be	 committed	 to	 the	 idea	of	 a	 shared	political	project	 that	 rules	out	violence,	even	 among	 unequal	 members	 who	 are,	 nonetheless,	 all	 members.13	This	 is	 the	 thin	understanding	of	the	political	that	civil	disobedience	requires	for	conceptual	coherence.		 So	 the	commitment	 to	 the	political	 is	 inconsistent	with	other-directed	constitutive	personal	 violence.	 The	 same	 is	 not	 true	 of	 violence	 directed	 at	 property;	 protests	 can	include	 other-directed	 constitutive	 property	 violence	 and	 remain	 within	 the	 conceptual	bounds	 of	 civil	 disobedience.14	Since	 property	 is	 not	 part	 a	 potential	 member	 of	 the	political	 project	 of	 living	 together,	 destroying	 property	 does	 not	 set	 anyone	 outside	 the	political	project	and	so	does	not	contradict	a	commitment	to	that	project.																																																									13	Interestingly,	this	gestures	towards	a	potential	explanation	of	one	of	Chenoweth	and	Stephan’s	interesting	findings,	 namely	 that	 nonviolent	 resistance	 was	 uniquely	 ineffective	 with	 respect	 to	 secession.	 Since	secession	 is	 undertaken	 precisely	 on	 the	 premise	 of	 breaking	 apart	 a	 political	 community,	 it	 is	 difficult	 to	express	a	commitment	to	the	political	in	such	cases.	14	More	precisely,	the	relevant	distinction	is	between	violence	directed	at	persons	and	violence	not	directed	at	persons.	This	latter	category	includes	more	than	property,	for	example	including	unowned	elements	of	nature	like	wild	animals.	 I	 should	note	 that	nothing	 in	my	argument	excludes	violence	 towards	animals	 from	civil	disobedience;	although	I	think	such	violence	is	tactically	unwise	and	most	often	unjustified,	it	does	not	seem	to	 exclude	 any	 persons	 from	 the	 realm	 of	 the	 political,	which	 is	 the	 only	 conceptual	 constraint	 that	 I	 rely	upon.	
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	 As	 noted	 above,	 a	 particularly	 good	 example	 of	 civil	 disobedience	 that	 includes	property	 violence	 occurred	 in	 Ferguson,	 MO	 in	 the	 aftermath	 of	 the	 killing	 of	 Michael	Brown	 in	 2014.	 In	 addition	 to	 a	wide	 range	 of	 disobedience,	 including	 nonviolent	 direct	action	as	well	as	conflicts	with	police,	protestors	set	a	police	cruiser	ablaze.15	This	kind	of	property	violence	 is	highly	symbolic.	Protestors	were	objecting	to	Brown’s	death	and	the	lack	of	legal	accountability	but,	as	they	made	clear,	also	more	broadly	to	the	local	police	and	courts	and	routinized,	 severe	abuse.	As	 the	Department	of	 Justice	 later	 confirmed	after	a	detailed	 investigation,	 the	 local	 municipality	 was	 egregiously	 violating	 residents’	Constitutional	 rights	 across	 a	 wide	 range	 of	 practices,	 often	 with	 a	 marked	 racial	 bias	(United	 States	 Department	 of	 Justice	 2015).	 Burning	 the	 police	 car,	 the	 very	 symbol	 of	prowling	oppression,	is	a	precise,	clear	symbol	of	outrage	and	condemnation.	Accounts	of	civil	disobedience	should	make	room	for	this	sort	of	violence.		 Some	definitions	 of	 civil	 disobedience	 as	 necessarily	 nonviolent	may	 be	 implicitly	relying	on	 the	distinction	between	personal	and	property	violence	 (Cohen	1972,	p.	298).	Rawls	notes	the	distinction	but	rests	his	case	on	the	problems	with	personal	violence:		[Civil	 disobedience]	 tries	 to	 avoid	 the	 use	 of	 violence,	 especially	 against	
persons,	not	from	the	abhorrence	of	the	use	of	force	in	principle,	but	because	it	is	a	final	expression	of	one’s	case.	To	engage	in	violent	acts	likely	to	injure	
and	 to	 hurt	 is	 incompatible	 with	 civil	 disobedience	 as	 a	 mode	 of	 address	(1999,	p.	321,	my	emphasis).		If	Rawls	or	others	only	ever	meant	to	rule	out	violence	against	persons,	then	we	agree.	But	if	 so,	 this	 restriction	 should	 be	made	 explicitly.	 This	 is	 especially	 important	 because	 the	rhetoric	used	against	disobedients	often	fails	to	make	precisely	this	distinction.	If	property	is	destroyed,	then	protests	are	often	dismissed	as	outside	the	bounds	of	political	practice,	as	inviting	anarchy,	as	unprincipled	law-breaking,	and	so	on.		 At	this	point	it	may	be	tempting	to	distinguish	between	public	and	private	property	in	order	to	claim	that	civil	disobedience	can	include	violence	towards	public	but	not	private	property.	The	Ferguson	case	is	plausible	because	destroying	public	property	can	be	highly	symbolic	but	private	property	is	different.	As	a	conceptual	matter,	though,	this	seems	to	me	to	be	mistaken.	Directing	violence	at	private	property	does	not	show	that	the	owner	of	that	property	is	outside	the	political	community.	Imagine	a	country	of	radical	wealth	inequality.	Protesting	 against	 such	 inequality	 by	 seizing	 and	 destroying	 the	 gold-encrusted	 jet	 of	 a	plutocrat	 is	 an	 eminently	 symbolic	 and	 striking	 form	of	 protest.	 Given	 that	 the	plutocrat	himself	is	not	threatened,	I	do	not	see	why	such	an	act	would	be	conceptually	inconsistent																																																									15	Individual	actions	must	be	evaluated	within	the	broader	context	of	a	movement	and	in	the	Ferguson	case	much	more	than	the	police	car	burning	occurred,	as	the	pictures	show,	so	for	our	purposes	here	I	am	making	no	 claims	 about	 whether	 the	 overall	 evening	 constituted	 civil	 disobedience.	 Another	misleading	 aspect	 of	considering	 individual	 instances	 of	 law-breaking	 is	 that	 it	 obscures	 the	 group	 nature	 of	 civil	 disobedience	(Arendt	1972).		
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with	a	commitment	to	the	political.	It	does	not	push	the	person	outside	of	the	bounds	of	the	political	community.	There	are	important	differences	between	how	we	treat	someone	and	how	we	 treat	 their	 property,	 especially	 given	 that	 the	 shape	 of	 actual	 property	 holdings	depends	upon	political	arrangements	and	is	not	exogenous	thereto.	Recall	that	many	forms	of	protest	that	obviously	fall	within	the	conceptual	bounds	of	civil	disobedience	set	back	the	interests	of	others,	such	as	blocking	traffic,	sit-ins,	strikes,	and	so	on.	Some	of	the	costs	involved	in	such	actions	will	be	costs	to	the	property	of	others,	if	 indirectly,	 as	when	businesses	 lose	 customers	 and	 so	 lose	profit	 or	when	police	divert	resources	to	protests,	leaving	other	areas	unattended.	We	cannot	rely	on	the	general	claim	that	setting	back	the	interests	of	other	citizens	without	their	consent	treats	them	as	outside	the	political	project	without	eviscerating	the	practice	of	civil	disobedience	to	its	core.	Given	that,	 it	 is	hard	to	see	why	violent	destruction	of	property	would	treat	them	as	apart	from	the	political	project	even	though	setting	back	their	interests	in	a	variety	of	other	ways	does	not	 do	 so.	 And	 as	 Raz	 (2009)	 notes,	 even	 some	 legal	 and	 nonviolent	 modes	 of	 political	protest	may	be	substantially	harmful,	as	with	a	strike	by	ambulance	drivers.	Ultimately	the	distinction	 between	 violence	 done	 to	 public	 property	 versus	 private	 property	 does	 not	seem	relevant	to	the	concept	of	civil	disobedience.			 This	does	suggest,	however,	that	in	some	contexts	property	violence	is	inconsistent	with	a	commitment	to	the	political.	These	are	cases	where	violence	directed	at	property	is	a	more	direct	strike	at	a	person.	Examples	would	include	destroying	their	only	shelter,	taking	away	their	last	food	or	water,	and	so	on.	There	are	minimal	material	conditions	on	the	sort	of	 life	 one	 needs	 to	 live	 in	 order	 to	 be	 a	 member	 in	 the	 political	 project.	 If	 people	 are	starving	or	otherwise	scrambling	just	to	stay	alive,	they	cannot	participate	in	the	right	way.	Taking	away	 those	preconditions	on	political	membership	 thus	strikes	at	 the	person	qua	co-member	 in	 the	 political	 project,	 so	 civil	 disobedience	 cannot	 be	 violent	 in	 such	ways.	The	relevant	issue	in	such	cases,	though,	is	the	harm	done	to	the	person	qua	co-member	of	the	political	project,	not	the	mere	fact	that	it	was	their	property	or	that	it	was	violent.	In	conclusion,	civil	disobedience	is	conceptually	consistent	with	reprisal	and	related	violence,	 self-directed	 constitutive	 violence,	 and	 other-directed	 constitutive	 property	violence	but	is	not	consistent	with	other-directed	constitutive	personal	violence.	The	latter	sort	of	violence	removes	others	from	the	political	project	so	contradicts	the	commitment	to	the	political	that	lies	at	the	conceptual	and	normative	core	of	civil	disobedience.		As	many	of	the	theorists	above	have	noted,	resorting	to	violence	immediately	calls	into	question	one’s	commitment	to	the	political.	Even	in	those	cases	where	I	have	argued	that	 violence	 is	 not	 necessarily	 inconsistent	 with	 such	 a	 commitment,	 the	 question	 of	effectiveness	 matters.	 Due	 to	 this,	 it	 is	 probably	 true	 that	 any	 instance	 of	 violent	 civil	disobedience	 should	 be	 accompanied	 by	 other	 elements	 that	 can	 clearly	 establish	 a	commitment	 to	 the	 political,	 perhaps	 including	 non-anonymity,	 willingness	 to	 accept	punishment,	and	so	on.	While	I	agree	with	revisionist	theorists	that	such	elements	are	not	necessary	to	the	concept	of	civil	disobedience,	the	fact	that	violence	is	so	likely	to	obscure	
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the	principled	nature	of	civil	disobedience	means	that	uncivil	disobedience	often	requires	support	from	these	additional	elements	in	order	to	be	effective.	Similar	thoughts	apply	to	what	 sorts	 of	 violence	 should	be	 chosen;	 the	 less	 related	violence	 is	 to	 the	disobedients’	claims	of	injustice,	the	less	effective	the	civil	disobedience	is	likely	to	be.		 There	are,	though,	limits	to	such	pragmatic	thoughts.	Too	much	concern	about	how	the	message	will	be	received	stifles	political	protest	and	can	be	used	as	a	tool	of	oppression.	Just	 as	 some	 will	 condemn	 any	 violence	 against	 property	 as	 crossing	 the	 line,	 thus	tarnishing	disobedients’	reception,	so	some	social	commentators	will	reliably	condemn	any	law-breaking	whatsoever	as	anarchist,	unjustified,	and	vicious.	While	care	must	be	taken	to	make	 one’s	 position	 clear	 and	 convincing,	 the	 fact	 that	 some	 recipients	 will	 obfuscate	cannot	 be	 decisive,	 for	 otherwise	 no	 political	 protest	would	 ever	 be	 undertaken	 and	we	would	lose	the	many	goods	of	civil	disobedience	as	a	contestatory	political	practice.			
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